This page summarizes works done with my supervised students.
- 2023— - Owen Le Gonidec,
Securing RISC-V System-on-Chip against Energy-based Attacks. (co-supervised with Maria Méndez Real, IETR and Jean-Christophe Prévotet, INSA Rennes)
- 2021— - Amélie Marotta,
Electromagnetic injection fault models and countermeasures for RISC-V sw
FPGA processors. (co-supervised with Ronan Lashermes, INRIA/LHS, Olivier Sentieys, INRIA/TARAN and Rachid Dafali, DGA-MI)
- 2020— - Vincent Giraud, Exploration of code security and of operating
system security. (co-supervised with David Naccache, ENS
- 2017—2021 - Thomas Trouchkine, SoC physical security evaluation. (co-led
with Jessy Clédière, CEA/LETI)
PhD student’s individual thesis monitoring committee
- 2022 - Louisa Malki-Haegel: Fingerprinting of
embedded software implementation.
- 2021 - Ever Atilano Rosales:
Security of the secure boot against fault attacks co-supervised with Arnaud
De Grandmaison (ARM) and
(Sorbonne University, LIP6). The internship
is located at ARM Paris.
- 2020 - Yanis Belkheyar: Authenticated Disk Encryption co-supervised with
(ANSSI crypto team).
- 2019 - Vincent Giraud: Secure implementation of GlobalPlatform for Java Card
- 2017 - Thomas Trouchkine,
Hardware implementation of a Java Card Virtual Machine co-supervised with
- 2016 - Léo Gaspard,
Implementation of a Secure Operating System for Java Card smart card.
- After his training period, Léo published the paper “Hardening a Java Card
Virtual Machine Implementation with the MPU” at SSTIC 2018.
- 2017—2020 - Boris
analysis of the ISO-7816 stack.
- His report is available here : .
- He also had developed:
an open-source ISO7816 stack. This project aims to provide an open-source
implementation of the ISO7816-3 communication protocol from the reader side.
This protocol is ruling the interactions between a smartcard and a
card-reader when using its contacts to communicate.
- : an
open-source bridge to fuzz smartcard ISO7816 stack implementation.
CardStalker provides a UART-driven smartcard reader at the T=1 (see
ISO7816-3) level (link and physical layer), where most of the smartcard
reader devices on the market are only providing an APDU interface